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Poland’s economic and political transition, one of the most successful, has
depended very heavily on job creation in new firms to replace the jobs lost in the
formerly state-owned enterprises. This paper uses survey and aggregate data from
three Polish elections to suggest that these de novo firms, the individuals they
employ, and the residents in the local areas where they exist become an important
constituency supporting pro-reform political parties and constraining the actions
of parties less sympathetic to the reforms. The creation of this political constituency
helps explain how countries can successfully pursue both economic and political
reforms. 
JEL classification: D72, P26.




 Paper initially presented at the WDI/CEPR Annual Conference on Transitional Economies, Portoroz,
Slovenia, June 23–26, 2001. This work was supported in part by a grant from the Charles Stewart Mott
Foundation to the University of Michigan and while Jackson was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study
in the Behavioral Sciences. The opinions expressed in this paper are the authors’ own and not those of their








Accomplishing economic reform and democratization simultaneously is a daunt-
ing task, as many writers have observed (see Hellman, 1998). Yet, with varying
degrees of success a number of countries are accomplishing this feat, while others
seem unable to make the transition. A central factor contributing to economic suc-
cess is the country’s ability to encourage and support de novo firm creation and
growth, what Schumpeter calls creative destruction (see Caballero and Hammour,
2000; Jurajda and Terrell, 2001; Kornai, 2000). The Polish transition, often cited as
a success, has depended very heavily on job creation in new firms to replace the





1999, 2000; Winiecki, 2000). This de novo firm creation has political as well as
economic consequences.




ska, 2003) uses evidence from the
1993 Polish elections to argue that these creative economic activities nurture a
small but potentially growing constituency that supports pro-reform parties and
candidates. (The results support the predictions from Fidrmuc’s (1998) formal
model contrasting the interests of employees in the new private sector with workers
in the state sector and the unemployed.) Votes for pro-reform parties directly
help these parties to gain seats in the legislature. Indirectly, the growing presence
of this constituency, combined with the imperative to continue to win elections,
constrains the actions of non-reform parties that might otherwise pursue policies
that restrict or reverse the reforms. We use the Polish elections between 1991 and
1997 to demonstrate three related points: the emergence of a pro-reform constitu-
ency based on the growth of new enterprises; the support this constituency gives
to pro-reform parties; and that this new economy constituency affects the policies
of all parties, not just the pro-reform parties. 
The paper begins with a brief summary of findings on the role of de novo firm
creation in the development of market economies. The emphasis in this discussion
is on the implications of this process for the development of a pro-reform political
constituency. This is followed by an analysis of survey and election return data to
show the development of such a constituency and its support for parties committed
to further reform. We end with a brief discussion of the current party manoeuverings
and actions taken before and after the elections held in September, 2001. These
actions demonstrate the importance of this new constituency and how a variety of
parties are trying to capture its support. 
 
2. Creative destruction and pro-reform interests
 
Caballero and Hammour (2000, p. 11) contend that, ‘The evidence of extensive,
on-going job flows that are pervasive throughout the economy and constitute a
major mechanism of productivity growth points to the centrality of creative
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destruction in the growth process.’ Poland is certainly no exception. We report in




ska, 1999, 2000) that based on data from the
Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS) the birth and growth of new and small
enterprises employing over five workers in 1997 added about 2.4 million jobs to the
Polish economy between 1990 and 1997. Further, the Foundation for the Promotion
of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises estimates that in 1997 there were nearly
1.5 million firms with zero to five employees and these enterprises employed




anowski, 1999). Combining the estimates from the two
data sources suggests that 4.6 million jobs were created in firms started after the
transition began or in private firms with less than one hundred employees in 1990.
The creative process contrasts sharply with the destruction that took place among
the enterprises that were state and collectively owned and the large private firms
(those employing more than 100 workers) existing in 1990. This set of enterprises




3. Firm creation and individual attitudes
 
The proposition in our earlier paper is that the creation of these new firms and the
successful transition to the transformed economy they represent is accompanied
by the development of voters interested in continuing or even accelerating the
economic reforms. Data from the Polish General Social Survey (Cichomski and





 The variable combines responses to two questions to create a meas-
ure of respondents’ confidence in private economic firms relative to state-owned
firms. This variable ranges from zero to one, with one indicating a great deal of









 The gross job creation and destruction estimates suggest a net job creation in the Polish economy, which
is inconsistent with the persistently high unemployment rate. This obvious discrepancy can arise from a
number of sources. One is overly optimistic job creation figures in one or the other dataset. It is also likely
that individual Poles are now holding more than one job, so that the number of individuals employed is




 The specific advantage of the PGSS study is that the questions and survey methodology are fairly consist-
ent over time so observed changes more likely reflect changes in the populace than in survey methodology.
The exception is that researchers experimented with question structure in half the 1997 survey. We adjust
the variable definitions to account for these experiments. In the experimental half the respondents receive
the usual question and half are asked the new format. This split sample allows us to compare response
patterns and to then adjust the responses to the new formats accordingly. We have pooled the data from




 The precise question is: ‘I am going to name some institutions in this country. Would you say you have a
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first is that at the aggregate level this confidence should increase as the new private
sector becomes more successful. The second is that at the micro level, people
employed in new private firms should express more confidence in private firms than
people employed in enterprises remaining in the state sector, and this category
should expand over time. 
Table 1 Part A, shows the proportions of the respondents in the lower and upper
parts of the distributions and the gap between the two. The lower tail consists of
respondents who expressed hardly any confidence in private firms and some or a
great deal of confidence in state firms. People in the upper tail say they have some
or a great deal of confidence in private firms and hardly any confidence in state firms.
Confidence in private firms eroded substantially following the hardships of the early
1990s at the beginning of the transition. By 1997, with the aggregate economy improv-
ing and with substantial evidence of new firm creation, confidence improved. 
 Part B of the table shows the proportion of respondents with themselves or a
spouse employed in private non-farm enterprises, in joint stock companies, or in




 (The columns total more than 100 percent because
we count both the respondents’ and the spouses’ employment.) The biggest
employment change is in the proportion in joint stock companies, which are enter-
prises in the process of privatization. There is a large decline in the proportions
working in state enterprises, and a modest increase in employment in private
firms, which includes self-employment. We argue that it is the relative size of these
three groups that contributes to the support or opposition to reforms.
Part C of the table shows the proportion of the workforce employed in firms




 Unemployed individuals are counted in these categories as the question refers to current or most recent
employment. The omitted category is respondents or spouses who have never worked. 
Table 1. Confidence in private vs state firms and ownership of employer
1992 1993 1994 1995 1997
A. Confidence measure
% with low confidence 23.8% 30.3% 32.3% 33.4% 29.7%
% with high confidence 12.3% 8.6% 6.7% 7.1% 9.7%
Gap 11.5% 21.7% 25.6% 26.3% 20.0%
B. Ownership of respondent employer
Private firm (non-farm) 18.9% 16.4% 19.5% 20.6% 23.3%
Restructured firm 7.7% 9.2% 14.4% 14.3% 16.0%
State or cooperative enterprise 74.3% 75.3% 67.6% 67.6% 62.7%
C. % Employed in new firms (>5 employees) 4.4% 5.5% 6.6% 8.6% 14.0%
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workers. Parts B and C illustrate the growth in the size of the de novo sector, and
its potential for developing a pro-reform constituency. 
Not surprisingly, respondents in families with employees in the private sector
express far more confidence in the private sector than do workers in other ownership
sectors. Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients when we regressed the confid-
ence variable on a set of individual characteristics, including type of employer.
On the zero to one confidence scale, respondents where both family members
worked for a private employer have an expected confidence that is 0.12 higher than
respondents with both members in the state sector. The magnitude of this relation-
ship contrasts with other relationships, which are of the order of 0.01 or 0.02 for




 What may surprise
some is that there is no difference in confidence between respondents working for
state firms and those working for joint stock companies. As expected, unemployed
individuals have less confidence in private firms, though the coefficient of –0.02





 We also did the estimation using an ordered probit model, which better accommodates the ordinal nature
of the responses. The results were nearly identical, so we report the OLS model for ease of exposition.
Table 2. Confidence in private vs. state enterprises






Private employer 0.117 0.010
Never worked 0.063 0.009
Joint stock company 0.015 0.012
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Confidence, or lack thereof, in private firms is not simply a matter of employ-
ment circumstances. Education and income are strongly related to the level of
confidence, with the better educated and the better off being more confident in
private firms. The relationship with education may reflect individuals’ expectation
that a market economy will more highly value human capital than the command
economy. Or it may reflect a belief by the better educated that a private economy
will perform better for everyone than the previous economy, not just themselves.
People living in villages and women had less confidence in private firms. 
The relationship between confidence and age is particularly interesting. The
results show a very definite quadratic pattern, with confidence reaching its lowest
point about age fifty. This age would be about the point at which one has the most
difficult time dealing with an abrupt economic transition. Retirement may still
be a number of years away, yet it is very difficult to seek new employment. In
addition, one is likely to still have family responsibilities at that age. A second
explanation derives from the socialization into the political and economic system
which respondents might have received. Someone aged 50 in the early 1990s
would have been born in the early 1940s so that virtually all their socialization
would have taken place during the Communist years. Older respondents had
some exposure to the pre-Communist period, though that was not a particularly
optimistic period for Poles. Among younger respondents the later one was born
the larger a proportion of one’s life was spent during the period of resistance
during the 1980s, which would have undermined the attachment to the socialist
system.
 
4. De novo job creation and elections
 
The remainder of the paper examines the Polish parliamentary elections from 1991
to 1997 to test the proposition that job creation in new firms forms an element of
a pro-reform constituency. To anticipate our findings, at the level of individual
voters making choices among the competing parties and candidates and at the level
of voting returns by election district (voivodship) these new economic interests




 There is a high degree of stability in
voters’ positions on key issues and on how these issues relate to voting patterns.
At the aggregate level, the variations in vote shares across voivodships exhibit
quite stable relationships with variables describing the economic and social char-





 In the 1991, 1993 and 1997 elections Poland had 49 voivodships. Two were split into subdistricts for
electoral purposes. Because data are not available for areas smaller than a voivodship the statistical analyses
combine the districts in Katowice and in Warszawa into single districts that matches the voivodship. 
 




5. Polish elections: 1991–97
 
Poland conducted parliamentary elections in 1991, 1993 and 1997. There is a con-
siderable degree of continuity to the major issues during this period. In 1991, the
major issues were the role of the Catholic church in Polish civil and political life
and the role for former Communist leaders. Some parties, most notably the post-
Communist SLD, also campaigned against the effects of the stringent macro-
economic policies adopted by the incumbent reform coalition led by the UD. By 1993
the liberal reform economic policies and their consequences had become a major
issue. These three issues – the role for the church and church teachings, the political
access for former Communists, and the pace and direction of economic reforms –
are the major political fault lines though with different degrees of emphasis
through all three elections. (For extended discussions of the 1993 election, see Chan
(1995) and Powers and Cox (1997). Slay (1994) and Tworzecki (1996) have good
discussions of the 1991 and 1993 elections.) 
The configuration of contending parties and candidates is much less stable
through these elections. Table 3 shows the major parties and candidates and their
shares of the votes in each election. Twenty-nine parties won seats in the parliament
in 1991, which led to a succession of short-lived governments between 1991 and
Table 3. Major parties and vote shares




UW (UD + KLD) 13.4
Post-Communist
SLD 12.0 20.4 27.1
PSL 8.7 15.4 7.3
Post-Solidarnoßç Catholic and Union
Catholic 8.7 6.4




UP 2.1 7.3 4.7
Far Right, Nationalist
KPN/ROP 7.5 5.8 5.6
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1993. The UD, the largest member of the coalition governments between 1991 and
1993, is the party most strongly identified with the liberal economic reforms,
though there were divisions in the party between the economic liberals and the
social democrats. The KLD was a minor coalition member that consistently sup-
ported the liberal reforms. These two parties merged in 1994 to form the UW after
the KLD failed to win any seats in the 1993 election.
The SLD and the PSL are two so-called post-Communist parties because their
leaders were party officials in the Communist party before 1989. They formed the
governing coalition from 1993 to 1997. The SLD is a broad coalition, including the
former Communist trade union, the OPZZ. In 1991 the SLD campaigned strongly
against the economic reforms and in favour of state intervention to protect Poland’s
heavy industry (See Tworzecki, 1996, p. 59). Their economic platform became less
opposed to the economic reforms with each election, though they were continually
seen as opposing the reforms and their economic leaders continue to disparage the




odko, 2000). The PSL is an agricul-
turally and rurally based post-Communist party. It strongly opposes the economic
reforms and campaigns strongly in favor of continued subsidies for farmers and
state-owned firms. 




that could not unite into a single coalition, except in 1997. One group of parties,
led by the ZChN, was church related and advocated a strong role for the Catholic
church and strongly pushed the ban on abortions favoured by church leaders. The
ZChN was part of the governing coalition in 1993, but chose to run as part of a
Catholic coalition party in 1993. This coalition did not receive enough votes to win
seats in the Parliament following that election. 





the 1991 and 1993 elections. These are the Center Alliance (PC) in 1991 and the
BBWR in 1993. Each received enough votes to have a small bloc of seats in the





 ran as its own party in 1991 and 1993 and was part of the coalition
government in 1993. It strongly opposed the economic reforms and its defection
from the coalition in 1993 led to the fall of the last UD led government. It did not
receive enough votes in 1993 to gain seats. Prior to the 1997 elections the trade
union leader, Marian Krzaklewski, organized the AWS coalition that united the
trade union and Catholic parties. This coalition won a plurality of the votes in 1997
and formed a coalition government with the UW that lasted until the summer of
2000 when the UW left. 
The UP is included as a separate party even though it remained a small party,
eventually losing its base after 1997 and joining the SLD before the 2001 election.
It is an interesting party, taking positions opposing economic reform and the role
of the church that easily matched those of the SLD yet also strongly anti-Communist,




 movement. The UP
hoped to build its base among voters who opposed the reform, but who would
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not vote for the SLD because of its leaders’ Communist background. As evidenced
in Table 3, this strategy was not viable.
Lastly, there have been a series of small but strongly nationalistic parties that
won a small portion of the vote and a few seats in parliament. In addition to their
nationalism, these parties advocated a very populist economic programme in opposi-
tion to the liberal reforms, were strongly anti-Communist and generally were sym-
pathetic to the church leaders. The KPN most vocally pushed this platform in 1991
and 1993, after which it lost its influence. Even though the KPN continued to exist
as a party, its influence was taken over by the ROP, led by Jan Olszewski. There
were attempts to get the ROP to join the AWS coalition, where there would have
been agreement on many policies, but Olszewski chose to run separately in 1997. 
This abbreviated description of the major issues and various parties and candid-
ates contesting each election helps to predict the likely vote choices of individuals
supporting the economic reforms and with strong confidence in private firms.
These people are most likely to support the UD/UW party. They are unlikely to
support the SLD, the PSL and the UP among the left parties or the Solidarity Trade
Union on the right. The pro-reformers may be somewhat ambivalent about the
Catholic parties, who did not support the liberal reforms but who did not take
highly visible positions on the economy and were part of the liberal government
up to 1993. These brief descriptions also indicate additional variables needed to
correctly specify the individual and aggregate vote models.
 
6. Individual vote choices
 
We begin by analyzing individual vote choices for the various elections using data
collected in the Polish General Social Survey (Cichomski and Morawski, 1998). The
individual data allow us to relate vote choices to attitudes that cannot be observed
at the aggregate level. A multinomial logit model is used because the vote variable
is the result of choices among several alternatives. For the 1991 and 1993 elections
the votes for the UD and the KLD are combined to reflect a vote for an economic
liberal party. This also makes the results comparable to the 1997 election where
these two parties had formally merged to create the Union of Freedom, UW. We
denote a vote for either the UD or the KLD in 1991 and 1993 as a vote for the UW.
The other parties treated explicitly in the analysis are the SLD, the PSL, the UP, the




 trade union. In 1997 these latter two parties
formed a coalition that ran under the acronym AWS. Votes for all the other minor





 The dependent variable in the analysis is the log of the probability of




 In the aggregate analysis in 1993 we include the KPN and the BBWR explicitly. In the individual analysis
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. Each of these log
odds ratios is then related to a set of explanatory variables that includes the meas-









































XiBpsl + Ui,psl (2)
log(Pi,up/Pi,uw) = XiBup + Ui,up (3)
log(Pi,cath/Pi,uw) = XiBcath + Ui,cath (4)
log(Pi,solid/Pi,uw) = XiBsolid + Ui,solid (5)
log(Pi,other/Pi,uw) = XiBother + Ui,other   (6)
The central variable in our analysis of individual vote choices is the one meas-
uring respondents’ confidence in private relative to state firms. We expect vari-
ations in this attitude to be strongly related to individual vote choices, particularly
as the transition proceeds and as economic issues become an important part of the
political debate. Two other attitude variables are included because they capture the
other main areas of conflict among the major parties and candidates in the Polish
elections during the 1990’s. Respondents were asked about their assessment of
Communism as a form of government and about whether churches have too much
or too little political influence.10 In addition to these three attitude variables we
include several variables to capture specific aspects of each campaign and party
strategy. Three variables indicate whether respondents are farmers on private or
state-owned farms and/or live in a rural village. We expect the private farming
and village variables to be strongly related to votes for the PSL, which is an
agriculturally and rurally based party. Farmers on state-owned farms are more
likely to be SLD supporters, as the collective farms were organized much like
9 The probability of person i voting for the UW is implicit in this specification, as Pi,sld + Pi,psl + Pi,up +
Pi,cath + Pi,solid + Pi,other + Pi,uw = 1. If we define  then Pi,ud = 1/D, ,
, and so forth. 
10 The questions are: ‘Thinking about all different kinds of governments in the world today, which of these
statements comes closest to how you feel about Communism as a form of government? Worst Form; Bad,
but no worse than some; Good for some countries; Good Form; Don’t Know’ and ‘Do you think that
churches and religious organizations in this country have far too much power, too much power, about the
right amount of power, too little power, or far too little power, don’t know?’
D e e eX B X B X Bi sld i psl i other  (         )= + + + … +1 P e Di sld
X Bi sld
,   /=
P e Di psl
X Bi psl
,   /=
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state-owned firms. We also include variables to indicate whether respondents live
in the home district of one of the parties’ leaders or candidates to capture any
localized campaign effects. Lastly, the 1997 model for the AWS and the SLD
includes a dummy variable to indicate whether the respondent resides in one of
the nine voivodships where Wa4´sa received over forty percent of the vote in the
first round of the 1995 Presidential election. The Wa4´sa campaign formed an
important organizational base for the Church and Solidarnoßç trade union coalition
that formed the AWS. Because of these organizational efforts voters in these dis-
tricts are more likely to vote for the AWS than comparable voters in other regions.
It is important to keep in mind that we are trying to capture the organizational
influences that might exist in these regions. We are not simply relating individuals’
1997 vote to their vote in the previous election. The results of the statistical analysis
are shown in Table 4. 
Our interest is in the association between people’s confidence in private firms
relative to state-owned firms and their vote choices. Table 5 shows the expected
difference in vote probabilities between representative respondents who don’t
know how much confidence they have in both private and state firms (who
scored a 0.5) and ones who have a great deal of confidence in private firms but
are still uncertain about their confidence in state firms (who scored a 0.83). This
representative respondent is not a farmer and does not live in a rural village. (Such
representative persons comprise between 65 and 75 percent of the voters in each
of the surveys.) 
There are a number of important comparisons in this table. Economic considera-
tions played only a small role in the 1991 election, which was held after the start
of the stringent reforms but before the full scope of their costs became apparent.
Even in that election, those with more confidence in private firms were more likely
to vote for the pro-reform coalition represented by the UD and KLD and less likely
to vote for the SLD, the PSL, or the Solidarnoßç Trade Union. In percentage terms
among the group of representative voters, these magnitudes are a 3.2 percent
gain for the UW, a loss of 1.6 percent for the SLD, a 1.4 percent loss for Solidarnoßç
and about a 1 percent loss for the PSL. The reverse differences would be true for
respondents with more confidence in state firms. The relatively small differences
in vote probabilities associated with differences in this attitude suggest this issue
was not a particularly salient one in 1991. 
Beginning with the 1993 election the differences in expected vote choices associ-
ated with different levels of confidence in private firms are fairly substantial and
consistent. Respondents with more confidence in private firms were more likely to
vote for the UW and less likely to vote for the SLD or the Solidarnosc Trade Union
and to a lesser extent the UP. Again, if we think in terms of homogeneous groups
of average voters who differ only in their confidence in private firms, the UW share
is 10 and 13 percent higher in the more confident group in 1993 and 1997, respectively.
The SLD share is seven and five percent lower in the two elections and the AWS
share almost seven percent lower in 1997. The larger vote differences associated
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Table 4. Estimated individual vote choice equations
   
Variable SLD PSL
1991 1993 1997 1991 1993 1997
Confid. in Private enterprise –1.22 –2.48 –2.11 –0.46 –2.53 –1.99
(0.54) (0.65) (0.49) (0.87) (0.73) (0.75)
Communism 2.88 2.51 2.92 1.69 1.89 1.26
(0.47) (0.52) (0.43) (0.59) (0.57) (0.54)
Church power 4.45 2.74 3.92 0.86 0.56 0.97
(0.69) (0.62) (0.52) (0.79) (0.69) (0.74)
Private farmer 0.42 0.92 –0.65 1.85 2.30 1.17
(0.70) (1.14) (0.65) (0.54) (1.08) (0.65)
SOE farmer 1.11 0.37 1.13 0.56 0.13 1.49
(0.47) (0.61) (0.81) (0.57) (0.60) (0.84)
Village –0.98 0.04 0.61 1.93 1.77 2.31
(0.41) (0.36) (0.29) (0.39) (0.34) (0.37)
Wa4´sa Voiv –0.54
(0.25)
UD candidate –0.58 –1.04 –0.40 –0.58 –1.04 –0.40
(0.30) (0.50) (0.27) (0.30) (0.50) (0.27)
Party candidate 0.75 0.88 2.02 1.95 0.10
(0.58) (0.41) (1.20) (0.55) (0.86)
Catholic Parties Solidarity AWS
1991 1993 1991 1993 1997
Confid. in Private enterprise –0.48 0.11 –0.51 –2.49 –1.83
(0.58) (1.16) (0.44) (0.87) (0.42)
Communism 0.30 –1.47 0.32 1.38 –0.92
(0.48) (1.00) (0.39) (0.70) (0.38)
Church power –4.89 –6.22 –1.18 –3.27 –2.66
(0.70) (1.28) (0.48) (0.94) (0.48)
Private farmer 0.69 2.65 0.33 –0.44 0.34
(0.54) (1.42) (0.46) (1.49) (0.59)
SOE farmer –14.36 –3.49 0.38 0.12 0.62
(3.56) (5.44) (0.40) (0.78) (0.77)
Village 0.21 –0.45 0.39 0.63 0.71
(0.32) (0.65) (0.24) (0.43) (0.25)
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Wa4´sa Voiv 0.44
(0.17)
UD candidate –0.58 –1.04 –0.58 –1.04 –0.40




1991 1993 1997 1991 1993 1997
Confid. in Private enterprise 0.40 –1.51 –2.03 –0.23 –0.65 –1.09
(0.90) (0.80) (0.67) (0.37) (0.55) (0.61)
Communism 1.17 1.12 0.96 0.17 0.57 0.72
(0.78) (0.66) (0.57) (0.33) (0.49) (0.50)
Church power –1.01 1.21 1.38 –0.13 –0.92 –0.34
(1.02) (0.77) (0.71) (0.40) (0.46) (0.65)
Private farmer –14.36 0.11 –0.25 0.98 1.31 0.98
(3.56) (1.48) (0.81) (0.38) (1.11) (0.67)
SOE farmer 0.52 0.06 1.07 0.25 –0.51 –0.48
(0.79) (0.76) (0.95) (0.35) (0.64) (1.25)
Village –0.21 0.22 0.58 0.45 0.44 0.77
(0.57) (0.44) (0.38) (0.20) (0.32) (0.34)
UD candidate –0.58 –1.04 –0.40 –0.58 –1.04 –0.40
(0.30) (0.50) (0.27) (0.30) (0.50) (0.27)
Party candidate 1.17
(0.63)
Catholic Parties Solidarity AWS
1991 1993 1991 1993 1997
Table 4 (cont). Estimated individual vote choice equations
with differences in this confidence variable in the 1993 and 1997 elections suggest
the salience of this issue emerged during the course of the transition and that
the variable is not spuriously reflecting some other difference among voters. It is
significant that increasing confidence in private firms reduced the vote of the AWS
more than it did the SLD in 1997, suggesting that the AWS may have been seen as
even less supportive of the new private sector than the SLD among the non-farmer
and non-rural respondents.
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The coefficients on the other variables match expectations, or are not important.
Those who think Communism is a good form of government are more likely to
vote for one of the Post-Communist parties and less likely to vote for the UW or
the right wing parties. Assessments of the influence of church organizations play
a large and consistent role in people’s vote decisions. (For more on the church role
in 1993, see Powers and Cox, 1997.) Those who think the church has too much
power are much more likely to vote for the SLD, who most strongly opposed the
positions advocated by church leaders. Conversely, those who think the church
had too little influence were much more likely to vote for the Catholic party in
1991, the Catholic coalition party or Solidarnoßç Trade Union in 1993, and the AWS
in 1997. Private farmers and villagers are more likely than other respondents to
vote for the PSL in all the parliamentary elections. Farmers on state-owned farms
are more likely to vote for the SLD in 1991, but other than that election, their vote
choices are not significantly different from non-farm workers employed in other
state enterprises.
7. Election returns
The second part of our analysis examines the voting returns by district in the 1993
and 1997 elections. There are two relevant questions. The first is the role played by
new economic activity in building support for pro-reform parties, which will offset
some of the opposition to the reforms generated by the economic hardships. This
Table 5. Confidence in private firms and expected vote differences




Conf = 0.83 0.485 0.041 0.013 0.037 0.052 0.126 0.245
Conf = 0.5 0.453 0.057 0.014 0.031 0.057 0.140 0.248
Difference 0.032 –0.016 –0.011 0.007 –0.005 –0.014 –0.002
1993
Conf = 0.83 0.380 0.102 0.043 0.082 0.037 0.033 0.325
Conf = 0.5 0.279 0.171 0.073 0.099 0.026 0.055 0.296
Difference 0.100 –0.069 –0.030 –0.018 0.011 –0.022 0.028
1997
Conf = 0.83 0.394 0.140 0.020 0.052 0.291 0.104
Conf = 0.5 0.263 0.188 0.025 0.069 0.356 0.099
Difference 0.132 –0.048 –0.006 –0.016 –0.066 0.004
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proposition is measured by the ratio of jobs created in de novo firms to the total
workforce in each voivodship. The second question is again the stability of the
relationships between vote shares for each party and the variables representing the
variations in preferences on the basic issues – economic reform, antipathy towards
former Communist officials, and the role of the Catholic church. 
The model estimated with the aggregate data is very similar to what is shown
in equations 1–6. The difference is that the left-hand side variables now are the logs
of a party’s proportion of the votes in a voivodship divided by the UW’s proportion
of the vote. If we let Vj,x denote the proportion of the votes received by party x in
voivodship j, the estimated equations are:
log(Vj,sld/Vj,uw) = XjBsld + Uj,sld (7)
log(Vj,psl/Vj,uw) = XjBpsl + Uj,psl (8)
log(Vj,up/Vj,uw) = XjBup + Uj,up  (9)
 log(Vj,cath/Vj,uw) = XjBcath + Uj,cath (10) 
log(Vj,solid/Vj,uw) = XjBsolid + Uj,solid  (11)
A A
 log(Vj,other/Vj,uw) = XjBother + Uj,other.   (12)
This specification incorporates the constraint that the proportion of all votes in a
voivodship sums to 1, Vuw + Vsld + Vpsl + … + Vother = 1. The coefficients denoted by
B indicate how the votes for each party or for all other parties relative to the votes
for the UD vary with X. Because they received enough votes to get seats in parliament,
we include the returns for the BBWR and the KPN slates in the 1993 election and
the ROP party in 1997. The estimation procedure is adapted from the seemingly
unrelated regression model. (For a full description of the statistical model, see
Jackson, 2002.) The estimated models are presented in Table 6. 
The summary results, which we illustrate in the next section with a counter
factual exercise, are that regions with higher levels of new firm and job creation
return larger votes shares for the economically liberal UD+KLD pseudo-coalition
in 1993 and for the UW in 1997. These votes come at the expense of both the post-
Communist and right wing and trade union parties. The losses among the AWS
coalition in 1997 are particularly notable. Surprisingly, the regional unemployment
variable is not statistically associated with the vote shares of any of the parties and
in 1993 the coefficients did not have the expected sign. This result contrasts with
Fidrmuc (2000a, 2000b), who finds statistically significant associations between
unemployment and voting but only a weak relationship with entrepreneurial activity,
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Table 6. Estimated vote share equations
   
SLD PSL
Variable 1993 1997 1993 1997
% New jobs  –2.76 –7.11 –2.22
(2.92) (1.13) (2.73) (1.75)
% Unemployed –0.75 –0.41 0.16 –1.32
(0.97) (1.12) (0.98) (1.62)
% Jobs in SOEs 0.39 0.88 0.88 0.18
(0.62) (0.57) (0.55) (0.86)
% Farming 4.12 2.07
 (0.88) (1.26)
% Village 1.64 3.56
(0.54) (0.82)
Schooling –0.24 –0.23 –0.38 –0.30
(0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13)
Wage & salary –0.17 –0.12 –0.31 0.03
(0.19) (0.06) (0.18) (0.09)
% Age(35–59) 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Church attendance –1.85 –1.38 –1.16 –2.09
(0.53) (0.51) (0.47) (0.64)
Priests/(Pop/1000) –0.47 0.01
(0.24) (0.18)
Wa4´sa – 1995 –0.15
(0.10)
UD candidate –0.65 –0.08 –0.65 –0.08
(0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.21)
Party candidate 0.68 0.09 0.99
(0.19) (0.18) (0.21)
R-Square 0.75 0.72 0.95 0.91
Cath BBWR Solid AWS
1993 1993 1993 1997
New jobs –3.07 –4.22 –10.38 –3.20
(3.62) (2.87) (3.17) (1.12)
% Unemployed –0.47 –0.93 –0.68 0.18
(1.21) (0.97) (1.06) (1.11)
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% Jobs in SOEs –0.09 0.64 1.50 1.24
(0.77) (0.61) (0.68) (0.58)
Wa4´sa – 1995   0.45
  (0.10)
Schooling –0.11 –0.21 –0.28 –0.30
(0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09)
Wages & salary 0.24 0.04 0.05 –0.01
(0.24) (0.19) (0.21) (0.06)
Age –0.21 –0.05 –0.00 –0.17
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Church attendance 0.28 0.26 0.72 –0.07
(0.58) (0.46) (0.51) (0.47)
UD candidate –0.65 –0.65 –0.65 –0.08
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21)
% Village –1.43
(0.40)
R-Squared 0.75 0.65 0.71 0.84
UP KPN ROP Other
Variable 1993 1997 1993 1997 1993 1997
New jobs –6.32 –2.44 –13.85 –4.06 –6.75 –3.83
(2.46) (1.25) (3.78) (1.53) (3.13) (1.31)
% Unemployed –0.12 0.04 –1.27 0.79 –0.30 –0.47
(0.84) (1.24) (1.26) (1.51) (1.05) (1.30)
% Jobs in SOEs 0.80 0.89 1.05 1.82 0.33 0.71
(0.53) (0.64) (0.81) (0.81) (0.67) (0.67)
Schooling –0.20 –0.28 –0.06 –0.17 –0.26 –0.17
(0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10)
Wage & salary –0.01 –0.08 0.10 0.04 0.01 –0.04
(0.16) (0.07) (0.25) (0.09) (0.21) (0.07)
Age 0.03 –0.00 –0.03 –0.26 –0.11 –0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Church attendance –1.74 –1.49 0.35 –1.90 –1.91 –0.26
(0.39) (0.45) (0.60) (0.56) (0.50) (0.47)
Cath BBWR Solid AWS
1993 1993 1993 1997
Table 6 (concluded). Estimated vote share equations
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UD candidate –0.65 –0.08 –0.65 –0.08 –0.65 –0.08





R-Squared 0.60 0.65 0.63 0.79 0.77 0.67
UP KPN ROP Other
Variable 1993 1997 1993 1997 1993 1997
Table 6 (concluded). Estimated vote share equations
particularly in 1997. His finding of a weak relationship with entrepreneurial activity
is possibly due to a weak measure, which only counts the number of entrepreneurs
and self-employed, not total employment. Further, for his Polish analysis this
measure is the same in 1997 as in 1993, further suggesting an errors in variables
problem which could help explain both differences in our statistical results.11 We
interpret the associations between unemployment and voting as suggesting that
suspicion of the economic reforms and their consequences and the associated sup-
port for non-reform parties was fairly widely distributed among Poles, and only
the individuals and areas with significant success in the transition supported the
economically liberal parties. 
Another political consequence of the economic transition is seen in the positive
associations between the proportion of the non-farm workforce remaining in state-
owned, restructured, or privatized firms and the vote shares of the Solidarnoßç
trade union (or its AWS coalition) and right wing parties. These associations are
not surprising given Poland’s unique history prior to the transition. The trade
unions and their workers in the large state-owned enterprises were a key element
in the Solidarnoßç movement that led to the removal of the Communist govern-
ment. (By contrast, the much smaller and Communist backed union, the OPZZ, is
an important part of the SLD coalition party.) As a consequence they remained
strongly anti-Communist but opposed to the liberal reforms. (Remember that
members of the Solidarnoßç trade unions withheld their support of the Suchocka
government, leading to its demise and to the 1993 elections.) Thus, it could be
expected that workers in these large state enterprises would support the Solidarnoßç
11 An additional explanation for the difference between our and Fidrmuc’s results is that he does not include
a measure of church attendance in his Polish model. If we omit the church attendance variable from our
model, the coefficients on the unemployment variable more closely match his results. This deletion, how-
ever, would be a serious misspecification given the salience of the church question in these elections.
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party in 1993 and the AWS in 1997, as these parties were both opposed to the
liberal policies as applied to the state enterprises and anti-Communist. 
The other statistical results conform to expectations and are consistent with the
results of the individual analyses. Church attendance is strongly and negatively
related to votes for the SLD, the UP, and the PSL in 1993 and 1997. The votes for the
SLD are also negatively related to the number of priests per thousand population
in 1993 but not in 1997. This variable is included to represent the active opposition
of the Catholic church hierarchy specifically to the SLD. This opposition was most
evident in 1991 with some active opposition in 1993 and none after that. 
Education levels are negatively related to the votes for all parties except the
UW, though the coefficient for the Catholic coalition in 1993 is not statistically
significant. These results indicate that increasing years of schooling is associated
with increased vote shares for the Democratic Union/Freedom Union and that
these increases are associated with decreases for all the other parties, most notably
for the PSL and Solidarity/AWS. There is very little consistent association between
wages and salaries and vote distributions. The associations are negative with votes
for the SLD in all elections, but only statistically significant in 1997. These results
suggest that income differences are not the basis for political cleavages, at least in
the early stages of the transition. This may be a consequence of the fact that workers
in state enterprises were consistently well paid, both before and after the transition.
The variable assessing the proportion of the population between the ages of 35
and 59 is negatively associated with votes for the Catholic coalition in 1993 and
for the AWS and the ROP in 1997. These were the most strongly anti-Communist
of the contending parties and candidates, so this result is expected. Age is not
associated with voting for the two post-Communist parties relative to the UW. 
The campaign related variables have the expected coefficients. The proportions
of the population that farmed and/or that lived in a rural village are positively
associated with voting for the PSL, the party that specifically campaigned for more
and larger farm subsidies. The only instances where these results do not agree with
the individual results are the negative associations between the proportion living
in villages and the votes for the AWS and the ROP in 1997. These associations were
positive in the individual model and negative here. The associations between votes
for a party and the voivodship being the home for its leader are all in the direction
observed with the individual data, and are larger in 1993 than in subsequent years.
Lastly, the voivodships that voted most strongly for Wa4´sa in the first round in
1995 also voted heavily for the AWS in 1997, as observed with the individual data.
Observed collectively, the associations between the vote shares for each party
in the different elections correspond closely to our expectations and to the relation-
ships observed with the individual data. The relationships are also quite stable
between the 1993 and 1997 analyses. We have included measures for the factors
other than economic considerations that were important in these elections and the
fact that these measures have the expected coefficients provides greater confidence
that the coefficients on the economic variables are also what one should expect.
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Lastly, these equations explain a high proportion of the variance in the dependent
variables. This suggests that the models include most of the important factors
related to these votes, lending further credibility to the results. If the coefficients
on the economic variables are correct, at least within sampling variations of the
true values and particularly for the de novo firm job creation, we are then in a good
position to use these coefficients to explore counterfactual questions about how the
results might have differed with different amounts of job creation. 
8. Job creation and vote and seat shares
We illustrate the statistical result connecting voting for the liberal economic parties
to the level of de novo job creation through a counter factual exercise. This exercise
examines the expected change in national vote proportions for each party if there
had been a 50 percent increase in the number of new jobs between 1990 and the
year of the election.12 We also then examine how the distribution of seats in each
parliament might have differed as a consequence of the higher job creation. 
9. Jobs and vote shares
Table 7 shows for each party their actual vote share at the national level and the
expected change in their vote shares if there had been more new job creation.13 In
both 1993 and 1997 the additional de novo jobs would have added between two
and a half and three percent to the vote share for the UW. The parties likely to lose
votes in this scenario are the SLD and the Solidarnoßç trade union in 1993, the AWS
in 1997, and the ultra right wing parties in both elections. The SLD in 1993 and the
AWS in 1997 would be expected to lose between 1.5 and 1.7 percentage points
while the right wing losses varied between a half and about one percent. 
The negative relationship between additional job creation and votes for the
AWS and the far right as well as for the SLD is important on several grounds.
The relationship between new job creation and declining support for the AWS is
12 This is a substantial number of new jobs, but is useful for illustrative purposes. Relatively modest
increases in the rates of birth, survival, and growth of new firms could yield such an increase in the number
of new jobs over four to eight years. (See Jackson et al., 1997.)
13 The methodology used for the predicted vote shares is as follows. Let ∆X = (X* − X ) be the increase in
the de novo jobs as a proportion of the workforce and Vj and Vuw be the actual vote shares for party j and
the UW, respectively. Then the expected difference in the vote share for party j relative to the UW share
is given by , or , where bj is the coefficient relating
de novo job creation to the log of the ratio of the vote shares in equations 7–12. If there are J parties and we let
, then  and .
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consistent with the results observed with the individual data analyzed previously,
lending credibility to both results. The individual and aggregate results both sug-
gest that the growing economically liberal constituency had considerable reserva-
tions about the AWS, even more so than about the SLD. This may not be a surprise
as new business creation had grown dramatically during the latter years of the SLD-
led government. The result that more job creation is associated with less support
for both the right and left parties has a broad and important implication. Higher
rates of de novo firm creation increase the votes for liberal economic parties, which
are also the most centrist parties. Furthermore, these increased vote shares come
from both the left and the right parties, limiting the centripetal forces within the
political structure and institutions.
10. Jobs and seat shares
Swings of a few percentage points may not seem large, but in the context of Polish
elections and the electoral laws in place, these differences are significant. The
important question is not just how vote shares might have changed with additional
job creation, but what would have been the distribution of seats if there had been
these additional jobs in new enterprises? We explore this question by assuming
that de novo job creation in 1993 and 1997 is fifty percent higher in each electoral
district. The coefficients relating job creation to the votes for each party are then
used to predict the vote shares in each district, just as was done for the national
Table 7. Vote shares with greater job creation
Party 1993 1997
Actual % Change % Actual % Change %
UW 14.6 2.93 13.4 2.67
SLD 20.4 –1.71 27.1 –0.33
PSL 15.4 –0.34 7.3 0.23





KPN/ROP 5.8 –1.11 5.6 –0.53
Other 19.7 –0.24 8.1 –0.66
Notes: a. The Catholic parties joined with the Solidarnoßç trade union to form the AWS.
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proportions above. The d’Hondt seat allocation rule, which is the rule used to
allocate seats in 1993 and 1997, is then applied to these alternative votes shares to
determine the expected seat allocations. Table 8 shows each party’s actual seat
allocations and their expected allocations with the additional job creation. Because
we combined the votes for the UD and the KLD in 1993 to create a single liberal
economic party and to make the analysis comparable to 1997 when they had
merged, the ‘actual’ seat allocations in 1993 are the allocations that would have
occurred had these two parties combined and received the same votes as they did
running separately.14
The biggest change is the increased seat share of the UW, about 31 seats in 1993
and 21 seats in 1997. In 1993 these gains would have been at the expense of the
SLD with smaller shares coming from the right wing KPN. The PSL is predicted to
lose five seats and the UP four seats under this scenario. In 1997, the UW gains
were primarily at the expense of the AWS, with the SLD losing a handful of seats
and the ROP two seats. 
We conclude that additional de novo job creation would have helped the
liberal economic parties. It would have shifted votes and seats away from both the
14 This is an entirely plausible scenario, as these two parties had been closely joined in the previous govern-
ment and had nearly identical platforms. Recall that they did merge shortly after the 1993 elections to form
the UW.
Table 8. Seat allocations with greater job creation
Party Actual More jobs Difference
1993
SLD 161 144 –17
PSL 128 123 –5
UWa 97 130 +33
UP 37 33 –4
KPN 19 10 –9
BBWR 14 16 +2
1997
AWS 201 187 –14
SLD 164 159 –5
UW 60 81 +21
PSL 27 27 0
ROP 6 4 –2
Notes: a. This result is for the combined UD and KLD parties.
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post-Communist and the trade union and right wing parties. We saw the begin-
ning of the evidence for this conclusion with the analysis of individual attitudes
where people employed in the de novo firms constituted a strong constituency
favouring private firms and voting for economically liberal parties. This section has
extended this proposition to show that new job creation is linked to the actual
election returns in 1993 and 1997. Finally, we can trace higher rates of de novo job
creation to shifts in representation in parliament that follow from the expected vote
differences. These results form the core support for our argument that a constitu-
ency supporting liberal economic policies will evolve from the new firm creation
that is the key to successful economic reform. 
11. Economic policy and electoral politics after 1997
The electoral landscape changed dramatically after the 1997 election victory by the
AWS. The AWS/UW coalition that had governed since the 1997 election ended in
August, 2000 when the UW left the government after a period of bickering over
economic policy. Given the substantial differences in approach to economic policies
between Balcerowicz, the UW leader, and the trade union leaders in the AWS this is
not a surprise. Two months later Aleksander Kwaßniewski, the former SLD leader,
was reelected President, soundly defeating the AWS leader Marian Krzaklewski
and others without a run-off. The surprising second place finisher, also ahead
of Krzaklewski, was Andrzej Olechowski who ran without any party affiliation.
Following the election, internal conflicts permanently split both the UW and the
AWS. The conflicts over economic policy that ended the AWS/UW coalition formed
the basis for divisions within the parties as well. A division had always existed
within the UW (and before it the UD) between more social welfare oriented leaders
who were less enthusiastic about the rigorous economic reforms and the economic
liberals who promoted the reforms. This disagreement finally split the party in
late 2000, with the social reformers taking control. The AWS disintegrated, with the
Solidarity Trade Union deciding to leave the party and two new parties forming
to compete on the right wing. 
In a previous paper (Jackson, Klich and Poznanska, 2003) we propose that the
growth of new enterprises creates a constituency that constrains non-reform parties
from undermining economic reforms in addition to supporting economically lib-
eral parties. The political events and platforms leading to and following the
2001 election are consistent with this proposition. The advocacy of an economic
development policy based on the encouragement of de novo firm and job creation
was adopted explicitly by a new party, the Civic Platform (PO). The leaders of
this new party are the economic liberals who left the other parties – Andrzej
Olechowski, the independent candidate for President; Donald Tusk, Deputy Senate
Speaker and former KLD and UW leader; and Maciej P4aΩynski, Sejm speaker
and one of the AWS leaders. The Civic Platform’s economic plan nicely fits our
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proposition. In an interview in The Warsaw Voice (Jan. 28, 2001) Olechowski said,
‘Certainly, we target the middle class and those aspiring toward membership in
this class.…’ And later he said, ‘… our approach to the economy is the most com-
patible with entrepreneurs’ needs.’ 
Our contention that a liberal economic constituency constrains the actions of
other parties is evidenced in the platform of the SLD. In March, 2001 the party held
a conference where they hoped to attract entrepreneurs and business leaders by
promising to reduce red tape, taxes, and follow other policies to promote the pri-
vate sector. Their statements about economic policy in the party platform issued
before the election specifically mention the need to stimulate small and medium
sized enterprises and to reduce tax and regulatory barriers to their growth. These
are only promises, but they are promises from the party that only a decade earlier
was advocating government support for heavy industry and that when they con-
trolled the government between 1993 and 1997 was slow to promote privatization
and supported wage increases for workers in state managed firms that went far
beyond productivity increases and that exceeded wage increases in the private
sector (Jackson, Klich and Poznanska, 2000). 
These attempts by the PO and the SLD to appeal to the entrepreneurial class
are particularly remarkable when set against the background of the unemployment
rate. After dropping below 10 percent in late 1998, the unemployment rate was
close to 16 percent in the summer before the election, which was the peak during
the transition in 1992–3. But, instead of calling for more government subsidy and
intervention to protect employment in older firms, both parties claimed to offer the
best chance for stimulating job creation among new private enterprises. These pro-
posals by the SLD and the PO contrast sharply with the proposals coming from
the AWSP (the trade union faction of the AWS) and the right wing parties, who
increased their calls for various subsidy and protection measures for domestic
industries and agriculture. 
The election outcome was no surprise. The SLD-UP took 41.0 percent of the
votes and 216 seats.15 The Civic Platform (PO) was second with 12.7 percent of the
vote and 65 seats. There are two surprises in the election. One is that the vote
shares of the AWSP and the UW, 5.6 percent and 3.1 percent, respectively, are
below the thresholds required to obtain seats, which marks the likely end for both
parties, and for what remains of the Solidarnoßç movement from the 1980s. In the
case of the UW it is pretty clear that the defection of the economic liberals to the
PO drained the party of its strongest constituency and the remaining social liberals
did not form a large enough constituency to make the party viable. 
The other surprise is the success of three far right, nationalistic parties, which
together got 27.6 percent of the vote and 135 seats. The SLD finished 15 seats short
15 In a move that surely signifies the demise of the post-Communist/non-Communist distinction as an issue
for many Poles the UP, who won no seats in 1997, joined the SLD as a very minor partner further enlarging
the left wing coalition. 
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of a majority so was forced to partner with the PSL, with 42 seats, to form a coalition
government, despite the tension created by the vast differences between the two
on economic issues.16 In their actions and debates since taking over the govern-
ment the SLD has promoted business creation and support for small and medium
sized enterprises as means to combat unemployment and to raise the level of eco-
nomic growth. They continually label a key element in their economic programme,
‘Entrepreneurship Above All’ (Warsaw Voice, Jan. 6, 2002). The SLD leaders also
support a broad range of liberal economic measures such as accession to the EU.
In these decisions, the SLD had taken actions closer to those the PO would propose
than to those the PSL and the conservative and right wing parties want. For the
most part, the SLD policies have been consistent with their pre-election platform.
An exception to our proposition is the recent proposal by Grzegorz Ko4odko for tax
holidays and other subsidies for indebted state-owned enterprises proposed after
he was appointed Finance Minister in August, 2002. His full package, however,
also includes efforts to stimulate new enterprises and to aid small and medium
sized enterprises. Overall, the SLD actions since returning to power are consistent
with our contention that the growth and expansion of a constituency formed around
the generation of new enterprises has a major impact on the politics of the post-
reform parties. 
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